Do Donors and Aid Intermediaries Gamble with Poor People’s Health? Strategic Decision-Making by Donors and Aid Intermediaries on the Allocation of Development Assistance for Health by Stepping, Katharina M.K.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate
Student Conference Papers Conferences, Lectures, and Workshops
6-30-2010
Do Donors and Aid Intermediaries Gamble with
Poor People’s Health? Strategic Decision-Making
by Donors and Aid Intermediaries on the
Allocation of Development Assistance for Health
Katharina M.K. Stepping
Collegio Carlo Alberto and Philipps-University Marburg, Germany, katharina.stepping@iel.carloalberto.org
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences, Lectures, and Workshops at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers by an authorized
administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stepping, Katharina M.K., "Do Donors and Aid Intermediaries Gamble with Poor People’s Health? Strategic Decision-Making by
Donors and Aid Intermediaries on the Allocation of Development Assistance for Health" (2010). Cornell Law School Inter-University
Graduate Student Conference Papers. Paper 40.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/40
Do donors and aid intermediaries gamble with poor
people's health? Strategic decision-making by donors and
aid intermediaries on the allocation of development
assistance for health
Katharina M. K. Stepping∗†
June 30, 2010
Abstract
The distribution of development assistance for health in sub-Saharan
Africa is the visible result of decisions made by donors and aid interme-
diaries. Aid intermediaries have become increasingly important as con-
necting link between donors and recipients. Their heterogeneous group
comprises bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organizations, private foun-
dations, public-private partnerships and international non-governmental
organizations. Institutions, as rules of the aid game, constrain the actions
of aid intermediaries and inﬂuence transaction costs and incentives for the
organizations. The process of aid allocation is portrayed in two repeated
sequential games with two players, the donor and the aid intermediary.
Donors pursue an array of goals by donating ﬁnancial resources, while aid
intermediaries aim at securing funding in order to guarantee their organi-
zational survival. Donors use indicators to assess the performance of an
aid intermediary. Trustworthiness is a crucial factor prior to any experi-
ence. The strategic choice of the intermediary depends on the ﬁnancial
importance of the donor. A small-scale donor expects qualitative informa-
tion about achievements, whereas a large-scale donor asks for quantitative
results. The intermediary tries to ensure funding in the long-run without
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compromising its often charitable motives too much in the short-run. Al-
though the aid intermediary decides the aid-ﬁnanced health intervention,
the donor has an indirect but powerful voice in the aid allocation process
thanks to the importance of funding.
1 Introduction
Each year billions of dollars are transferred from developed countries to devel-
oping countries designated as foreign aid. The resource transfer of ﬁnancial
or in-kind resources is often perceived as a linear aid chain that links a donor
government to a recipient country. However, this predominant picture seems
overly simpliﬁed and inappropriate. Several types of major actors have been
identiﬁed to play a strategic role in a series of linked action situations and to
be connected to each other (Gibson et al. 2005: 63). The focus of this paper
is on the interactions between donors and aid intermediaries with respect to
health interventions ﬁnanced by aid. Donors are donor governments and pri-
vate donors. Aid intermediaries comprise bilateral aid agencies, multilateral aid
agencies, private foundations, public-private partnerships and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The broader deﬁnition of development
assistance employed here comprises resources from public donor, individuals,
private foundations and corporate entities.
Development assistance for health has emerged as an important branch of
foreign aid and has reshaped the institutional landscape over the past two
decades. First, unprecedented amounts have been made available for both
foreign aid and health-related assistance,1 partly motivated by the rise of the
HIV/Aids epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Total development assistance for
health quadrupled from 1990 to 2007, from a volume of $5.6 billion to $21.8
billion (IHME data). Second, private philanthropy and public-private partner-
ships for global health have emerged as new players during the ﬁrst decade of
the new millennium. Large-scale contributions by many multimillionaires or
even billionaires helped to establish new private foundations, for instance. Such
a ﬁnancial contribution is small compared to government funds for foreign aid
but large compared to the average small-scale donor (Bishop, Green 2009: 12).
This has led to signiﬁcant changes in the composition of development assistance
for health. In the 2000s, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies are still the
most prominent aid intermediaries but the importance of NGOs, global health
partnerships and private foundations increased considerably. Particularly the
1It is diﬃcult to quantify the importance of aid intermediaries for health-related devel-
opment assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. Roughly speaking, between 1990 and 2008, sub-
Saharan Africa received two thirds of total oﬃcial development assistance from bilateral donors
and one third from multilateral agencies. In 1990, bilateral donors provided approximately
$12 billion and multilaterals $7 billion. In 2008, bilateral donors provided approximately $30
billion and multilaterals $15 billion, after a peak of $50 billion and $13 billion, respectively, in
2007. Health-related development assistance varied considerably between 1995 and 2008 (for
which years data is available). The channels were reported for the last four years which allows
a slightly better idea of the importance of NGOs, public-private partnerships and multilateral
organizations. (OECD data).
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absolute changes are signiﬁcant because of the bigger volume of development
assistance for health (IHME data; also Lucas 2004: 290-291). Third, the global
health movement has become an important driving force for aid with a powerful
voice for prioritizing health. The predominance of health concerns within the
eight Millennium Development Goals is only example. Forth, celebrities increas-
ingly use their popularity to advocate international assistance. A well-known
example is the musician Bono who used beneﬁcial concerts and other charitable
activities to promote the idea of ﬁghting poverty by a substantial debt relief for
poor countries (West 2008: 77; also Bishop, Green 2009: 205).
Donors and aid intermediaries are often involved in an ongoing relationship.
The remainder of the article models the process of allocation of development
assistance for health as a multi round game with two players, the donor and the
aid intermediary. To focus on the interaction between donor and aid interme-
diary helps understand their decision-making. This approach allows isolating
the strategic decisions made by the players and identifying the underlying rea-
sons for their behavior. In the following, they will be treated as if they were
individuals. The two parties `negotiate' the volume, frequency and length of
their `contractual' relationship. The aid intermediary is expected to maximize
funding in order to guarantee its organizational survival by securing existing
resource transfers and raising new funds. The donor is expected to maximize
their satisfaction by donating money and pursuing their objectives. Donors can
be distinguished into small-scale donor and large-scale donors by the volume
of their donation. Two repeated sequential games are used to illustrate the
ongoing bargaining between the two parties. The ﬁrst one focuses on the inter-
actions between a small-scale donor and an intermediary. In the second game,
a large-scale donor and an intermediary take strategic decisions.
The analysis of the aid allocation process as a game with two players may
appear simplistic given the complexities of the resources transfer in reality.
However, it allows focusing on one important aspect, the funding, and thus
is adequate to understand the rationale behind the decisions of donor and inter-
mediary. An aid intermediary faces diﬀerent incentive structures depending on
the ﬁnancial strength of the donor. A small-scale donor has little leverage on
the intermediary. The organization is relatively unlimited in its choices about
priorities, focus and type of interventions. A large-scale donor puts much more
pressure on the intermediary. The organization needs to provide positive results.
These diﬀerences in the incentives provoke more eﬃcient or less eﬃcient pro-
grams or projects of health interventions. In addition, this paper complements
the discussion on aid eﬀectiveness by demonstrating how much more powerful
the voices of donors and intermediaries are compared to recipients.
To summarize, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 links the
relevant new institutional economics literature on foreign aid to development
assistance for health. In section 3, a new perspective on health-related inter-
national assistance focusing on donors and aid intermediaries is embedded in
the discussion on aid eﬀectiveness. Section 4 models the strategic interactions
between donor and aid intermediary as a multi round game. The ﬁnal section
of the paper is devoted to concluding remarks.
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2 Institutional aspects of foreign aid
Most research about international assistance focuses on the motives of donors,
the behavior of recipients and their relationship. However, some more recent
contributions do provide some insights about aid intermediaries, mainly bilat-
eral aid agencies. Like other organizations, also aid intermediaries are composed
of many individuals. If individual interests diverge from the collective interest,
the individual group member may not act in the best interest of the group.
Indeed, collective-action problems present a major obstacle to sustainable de-
velopment outcomes (Ostrom et al. 2001: 9-11). Moreover, agents involved in
foreign aid delivery have a variety of motives and objectives which are not neces-
sarily congruent with the oﬃcial, publicly announced, organizational objective
(Martens 2002b: 178). It has been studied how the development assistance sys-
tem generates incentive patterns that aﬀect sustainable outcomes by exploring
the relationships among the major actors involved in international assistance
(Gibson et al. 2005: 64). To improve aid intermediaries' eﬀectiveness, a more
explicit and systematic understanding of institutions and the incentives emerg-
ing within particular organizational structures is fundamental (Gibson et al.
2005: 224). Aid intermediaries are constrained by the rules of the aid game: in-
stitutions. Institutions and incentives are important parameters to understand
the internal processes of aid organizations. Institutions and their corresponding
organizational incentive structures aﬀect the aid delivery process and thus the
eﬀectiveness of foreign aid (Martens 2002a: 18).
Institutions, either inherent in development assistance or speciﬁc to the
structure of an aid intermediary such as a bilateral aid agency, may foster in-
centives undermining the goal of sustainable development. Institutions impact
the outcomes of foreign aid and much of its failure is related to institutions
structuring the delivery of foreign aid. For instance, the policy process may
face incentive-related problems, perverse incentives may aﬀect the international
development assistance process or donor agencies as well as their contractors
may suﬀer from perverse incentives leading to undesired outcomes (Ostrom et
al. 2001: 3, also Gibson et al. 2005: 6-7). Internal organizational institutions
and incentives are crucial: Not to consider the human beings involved in the
realization of aid projects and to ignore conﬂicting agendas between diﬀerent
links of the aid chain, will lead one to overlook two important explanations for
failure (Carr et al. 1998: 2, 44-46).
Institutions inﬂuence transaction costs and incentives, both for the organi-
zation as a whole and for its members. Following the economic doctrine, all
transactions entail transaction costs. Consequently, an additional link increases
the contractual costs and risks for the parties and causes new principal-agent
problems. One may assume that aid intermediaries must oﬀer something to
the donor and recipient to oﬀset the additional costs. It has been argued that
bilateral aid agencies mediate between the diverging preferences of donors and
recipients and can help to reduce transaction costs, depending on the domestic
political coalition supporting the aid program (Martens 2005: 654-655).
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Private giving and investment to the developing world can be distinguished
into philanthropy, remittances and private investment. In 2007, philanthropy
amounted to $49.1 billion, remittances to $144.6 billion, and private investment
to $325.4 billion. These three components sum up to $519 billion. Total private
ﬁnancial ﬂows represent 83 percent of all ﬁnancial ﬂows from developed to de-
veloping countries, compared to 17 percent of public ﬂows (Adelman 2009: 27).
Here, these ﬂows are taken into account as far as they involve an aid intermedi-
ary. Remittances represent a direct transfer between a member of the Diaspora
such as a foreign worker and the family as recipient, so no aid intermediary is in-
volved. In 2006, sub-Saharan Africa received remittances of $21.8 billion (IFAD
2007: 8). Another popular form of resource transfer between developed and
developing countries is child sponsorship (Wydick et al. 2009: 1). In any case,
it is diﬃcult to draw a clear-cut line. Despite the growing importance of health
assistance and the increasing attention paid to global health concerns, develop-
ment assistance and health are still discussed rather separately. The role that
aid intermediaries play for development assistance for health in sub-Saharan
Africa needs to be better understood. What institutions and incentives aﬀect
aid intermediaries? How and to what extent are aid intermediaries inﬂuenced
in their decision-making process?
Figure 12, 3 illustrates the resource ﬂow of development assistance for health
using the relevant organizations for sub-Saharan Africa as an example. The
principal actors of the aid chain are funding sources, aid intermediaries and
implementing organizations. The resources that aid intermediaries transfer can
come from public or private sources. National treasuries are the main source for
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies as well as global health partnerships. Pri-
vate citizens provide funds for public sources through taxes as well as through
private donations. Private philanthropists, typically large-scale donors, are iden-
tiﬁed by the volume of their donations. Corporations also make donations, often
as part of a social marketing campaign in the spirit of corporate social respon-
sibility.
The rhetoric about aid eﬀectiveness tends to draw the worldwide attention to
the intended beneﬁciaries, using the picture of needy people living in precarious
conditions. Beneﬁciaries do matter because it is ultimately their lives which can
improve thanks to intelligent aid-ﬁnanced health interventions. Beneﬁciaries
can be congruent with recipients but not necessarily. In any case, beneﬁciaries
are understood as the last link of the aid chain respectively as major actor.
This paper focuses on the interactions between donors and intermediaries. It
is argued here that the other interactions between intermediary and recipient
respectively beneﬁciary are adequately reﬂected in the level of the indicators
2The primary interest of this ﬁgure is to illustrate the resource ﬂow and the participating
actors diﬀerentiating between three groups: donors, aid intermediaries and recipients. Tech-
nically, aid can be given in form of grants or concessional loans, in kind and as debt relief.
For the sake of simpliﬁcation, debt repayment of concessional loans or debt cancellation is not
considered further because these ﬂows do not involve any intermediary.
3EC = European Commission, UN = United Nations, WB =World Bank, AfDB = African
Development Bank, GAVI = Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation.
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Figure 1: Resource ﬂow of development assistance for health
Elaborated from IHME 2009: 14.
used by the donor to assess the intermediary's activities.
Figure 2 depicts the most important links of the aid chain and the over-
lapping roles of aid intermediaries for health-related assistance. This represen-
tation simpliﬁes the diﬀuse network of organizations involved in the resource
transfer because their position with regard to the monetary ﬂow is only one
distinctive feature. In accordance with the origin and the use of their resources,
the following three categories can be distinguished: funding, transferring and
implementing aid intermediaries. These diﬀerent types of aid intermediaries
constitute a very heterogeneous group. Bilateral aid agencies and private foun-
dations can be considered as funding aid intermediaries due to the large fraction
of resources disbursed to other aid intermediaries or implementing organizations.
Global health partnerships and most multilateral aid agencies are transferring
aid intermediaries because they primarily transfer funds between donors and
recipients. UN agencies and international NGOs can be considered as imple-
menting aid intermediaries because of the large share of development assistance
for health used to implement their own health programs and research. (IHME
2009: 15)
Implementing organizations as recipients of development assistance are an-
other important link of the aid chain. They also have to make strategic decisions
with regard to funding and projects, for instance. The recipients are the last
agent of the principal-agent-chain foreign aid. The principal aid intermediary
as ﬁnancier expects a certain performance by the implementing organization,
needed to justify the success of an intervention ﬁnanced by the intermediary
against the donor as the original source of funding. The ﬁrst step for the aid in-
termediary is to raise funds. In a second step, an intermediary can decide about
its allocation. This paper focuses on the relation between donor and aid inter-
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Figure 2: Overlapping roles of aid intermediaries
Elaborated from IHME 2009: 15.
mediary. Two situations can be imagined that would cause the emergence of an
aid intermediary. In one case, resources are available and the donor searches for
a channel to transfer them and to pursue their objective  a bilateral aid agency
or a private foundation are a classic example. In the other case, an individual
or a group has identiﬁed a cause ﬁrst and then starts searching for funding to
support their objective  often the reason for a NGO to be founded.
3 A new perspective on development assistance
for health
The eﬀectiveness of foreign aid to promote growth and development in the recip-
ient countries has been ﬁercely discussed for several decades. Today's probably
most powerful voices are Jeﬀrey Sachs as advocate and William Easterly as
critic. Sachs argues that a historically unprecedented increase of foreign aid,
a `big push', is needed to get especially sub-Saharan African countries out of
the `poverty trap' and to `make poverty history'. Easterly argues that aid
programs on a large scale, designed by `planners' are condemned to fail. He
criticizes the lack of accountability, transparency and monitoring of the big
players in foreign aid. Easterly advocates `searching' for small-scale solutions
that work in a speciﬁc contest. The ongoing discussion about aid eﬀectiveness
between aid's critics and advocates appears to be missing two important points.
First, not all foreign aid is given for the same purpose (Lancaster 2007:
2). Political and strategic considerations are important determinants for the
allocation of bilateral aid across recipient countries (Alesina, Dollar 2000: 33).
Donor countries provide foreign aid to promote growth and development (and
thus poverty reduction); to pursue a variety of interests with their aid such as
diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian, commercial, and cultural purposes;
to build productive capacities, to support immediate consumption and human-
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itarian needs; to support democracies and build political systems; as well as to
foster strategic economic or political purposes. Other important factors inﬂu-
encing aid are widely shared ideas and norms shaping the aid-giving, the process
of political decision-making, what interests compete for inﬂuence over the aid's
purposes, and the internal governmental organization of aid management. (Lan-
caster 2007: 5-6; also Clemens et al. 2004: 1)
The broader objectives of donor governments are evident in statements and
decisions on amount, country allocation and use (Lancaster 2007: 13). On the
one hand, `de jure' goals are expressed in oﬃcial statements or documents issued
by the government. On the other hand, `de facto' goals are visible in actual
decisions that ultimately lead to actions. Almost all donor governments have
used increases in aid as a diplomatic means, a symbol of successful state visits
or international meetings (Lancaster 2007: 13). Donor governments usually
have to decide on several major issues each year: the amount of total aid, the
recipient countries and organizations and their respective share, the purposes of
aid, the terms and the percentage of aid tied to purchases in the donor country.4
These decisions such as the allocation of aid by country provide clues about the
donor's intention in aid-giving and the relative diplomatic importance of the
recipient country. (Lancaster 2007: 17)
Second, not all developmental purposes have the same time horizon. Some
aid interventions have a rather long time horizon and consequently development
eﬀects may be expected in the long-run: aid for health such as reducing infant
mortality might support growth in the long run (Clemens et al. 2004: 2).
Relaxing the linearity assumption between aid and growth as well as the aid
homogeneity assumption, a strong positive relationship is found between aid
directly aimed at growth such as infrastructure investments and growth (leaving
aside other types of aid not directly aimed at growth such as humanitarian
assistance). Not all health-related aid interventions have a long-term horizon;
curative care has a small or no time-lag between the intervention and the health
outcome.
It has also been argued that foreign aid given for the provision of global public
goods such as global health has a diﬀerent end purpose than aid to promote
development. Research, prevention, surveillance, treatment, and blocking of
the international transmission of diseases have a global strategic orientation
(Lancaster 2007: 16). In other words, some health interventions related to global
health have a global focus whereas the reduction of infant mortality might be
directly related to the sanitary situation in one speciﬁc place and thus has a
local focus. The time lag between an aid intervention and the health outcome
as well as the strategic focus of the health intervention is assumed to aﬀect the
incentives for the agent aid intermediary.
Under the assumption of a direct relationship between donor and recipient,
donor motives for foreign aid seem to inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of aid-ﬁnanced
4Some countries, such as Germany, might not decide about each of these points on an
annual basis. The budgetary decision for partner countries as well as the identiﬁcation of
priorities is usually done every three years. Despite the longer time horizon for some aspects,
the general idea remains the same: the government has to decide on it.
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interventions (Kilby, Dreher 2009: 7). It has been emphasized that the idea of
a direct donor-recipient framework for development assistance seems simpliﬁed
given the complexity of heterogeneous organizations involved in reality. Then,
it might be asked how these motives are transmitted in the longer aid chain of
donor-aid intermediary-recipient. A plausible explanation could be that donors
select the aid intermediary in accordance with their own motives in order to
ensure that their interests are pursued despite the additional link in form of the
aid intermediary.
Donors and aid intermediaries decide about the volume of aid, pursue objec-
tives with their aid interventions and have their preferences. Their interactions
are often of repetitive nature where both parties know the written and unwritten
rules as well as the consequences of non-compliance. The bargaining between
donors and aid intermediaries about the allocation of aid involves transaction
costs. Institutions provide incentives or disincentives for a certain behavior and
thereby have an impact on the costs of a transaction. The relation is character-
ized by imperfect and asymmetric information between the two parties causing
uncertainty ex-ante and ex-post of the resource transfer.
Figure 3 is a ﬂow diagram showing how aid ﬂows between donors and aid
intermediaries. The transfer of resources is depicted between a public donor
and a private donor, on the one hand, and health aid intermediaries in the form
of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, public-private-partnerships (PPPs),
private foundations and NGOs, on the other hand. The ﬂow diagram is simpli-
ﬁed because the interactions with the recipient respectively beneﬁciary are not
illustrated.
A private donor such as a citizen or a company can decide to provide re-
sources in the form of a voluntary donation. The aid intermediary to which the
donation is most commonly addresses is either a private foundation, a multi-
lateral aid agency (e.g. UNICEF) or a NGO. Apart from transferring resources
to an aid intermediary, a private donor can also make a direct donation to an
implementing organization; here understood as an organization that is active
locally in a developing country, for instance, a local NGO or the local govern-
ment. However, these direct donations are not further considered in this study
because they do not involve any aid intermediary.
Members of the Diaspora can also be private donors. Some successful mem-
bers of diasporas might consider it a noble deed to donate some of their re-
sources to the needy and those in a less fortunate situation than themselves.
(Bardouille 2008: 22). Donations usually support education and health care
services. These transfers tend to be of direct nature and are therefore not con-
sidered further.
Oﬃcial development assistance of a donor country is ﬁnanced through taxes.
Given the indirect funding, the taxpayer has only indirect political leverage on
development assistance for health through their vote during the next national
elections. A taxpayer supposedly cares less about the marginal share of taxes
spent on foreign aid than about investments for domestic matters.
Most typically, the donor government transfers oﬃcial aid to bilateral and
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Figure 3: Aid ﬂows between donors and aid intermediaries
multilateral aid agencies. However, NGOs have received increasing co-ﬁnancing
from public donors in the recent past, usually channeled through a bilateral aid
agency (Koch et al. 2009: 903). Resources are also directed at public private
partnerships such as the Global Fund or the Global Alliance for Vaccines.
The public donor can also cooperate directly with an implementing organi-
zation. However, this option is not further taken into consideration because it
does not involve any aid intermediary.
Donors
Private and public donors take strategic decisions about development assistance
for health: the initial decision to donate at all, what organization to make the
donation to (direct or indirect), the volume and the frequency of the donation
as well as the duration of the ﬁnancial commitment. Their decision-making is
subjected to mainstream opinion.5 It also depends on the behavior of other
donors. For instance, the decisions of the Millennium Challenge Corporation to
grant aid to developing countries appear to signal merit of recipients to other
donors (Dreher et al. 2010: 12). Both private and public donors have imperfect
information on the eﬀorts of the aid intermediary. Therefore, indicators are used
5A critical overview about thematic changes in foreign aid over the decades can be found
in Thorbecke: (2000): The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign
Aid, 1950-2000.
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to assess the performance of the agent and to decide about making a donation.
Private contributions may range from big donations by some individuals to
very small amounts by millions of private persons (Werker, Ahmed 2008: 78).
By deﬁnition, a donation is a transfer of resources without expecting anything
in return. A small-scale donor can usually deﬁne what projects the donation
may be used for. However, it is diﬃcult to control the aid intermediary. The
reputation of an organization serves as an indicator of trustworthiness for the
small-scale donor prior to any personal experiences. Only in such extreme cases
like fraud, the private small-scale donor disposes of legal remedies. Due to
the lack of leverage, a small-scale donor stays rather passive and reacts to the
perceived behavior of the intermediary. If the expectations are not met, a small-
scale donor can decide to end the ﬁnancial commitment.
It has been claimed that NGOs can reduce ex-post uncertainties about the
use of private gifts (Martens 2005: 660). However, it seems plausible to argue
that all well-regarded aid intermediaries have this potential. Any organization
with a reputation of being responsible with the donation and having as little
overhead costs as possible creates and fosters a donor's trust. The combination
of trust and reputation give the donor peace of mind and thus helps reduce ex
post uncertainties about the use of private gifts.
Private large-scale donors have more leverage on the allocation decisions
made by the aid intermediary. Thanks to the large ﬁnancial contribution, they
can attach strings to the donation. For instance, the total amount may be
split in several smaller donations and any subsequent contribution depends on
the results presented by the intermediary. Thus, the large-scale donor has the
potential to threaten the intermediary and is not conﬁned to passively observe
the intermediary.
The underlying motivation for a private donor can be the reduction of tax-
able income or true charitable motives. As mentioned, the reasons for public
donors to engage in resource transfers for health in sub-Saharan Africa can be
manifold. Their primary concern is not necessarily the eﬃcient use of develop-
ment assistance for health by the aid intermediary, since political reasons often
play a crucial role. However, donors are assumed to maximize the possible
impact of the ﬁnancial contribution, whatever the underlying objective might
be.
Aid intermediaries
Aid intermediaries are a heterogeneous group of very diﬀerent organizations.
With respect to bilateral aid agencies, the organization of aid management and
its location in the bureaucratic hierarchy varies across donor countries (Lan-
caster 2007: 7, 22-23). Some governments have uniﬁed their aid in one inde-
pendent cabinet-level agency (e.g. UK). Others have located their aid-related
activities in the ministry of foreign aﬀairs (e.g. Denmark). Some donor coun-
tries have a highly fragmented system where policy and implementation are
separated and aid programs are located in a variety of agencies (e.g. Germany).
It might be diﬃcult to clearly distinguish between the strategies of the donor
11
government and of the bilateral aid agency. Nonetheless, regardless of the or-
ganizational arrangement, both need an environment favorable to aid and thus
aim at creating political support for aid transfers.
Multilateral aid agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) are
well-known actors setting international standards for global health. The two
most prominent multilateral agencies in general are the World Bank and the
European Commission; two international actors in their own right (Lancaster
1999: 184). In all cases, a single international agency is jointly delegated by
donor governments with often diverging interests (Martens 2005: 656).
The term non-governmental organization serves as umbrella for an enormous
range of diverse organizations which can change substantially over its lifetime.
Development NGOs vary, for instance, in size and sector of activity, religious
orientation, their function and their relationships to donors and governments.
Whereas governments need to employ universalistic criteria and elaborate
rationales to select clients and favor one group over another, NGOs seem to
be conceded a more selective choice of aid recipients (Lipsky, Smith 1989: 631).
To pick intended beneﬁciaries according to religious, ethnic, geographic or other
factors may violate the unambiguous criteria used by oﬃcial aid agencies but
is usually not being criticized in the case of NGOs (Koch et al. 2009: 904).
In addition, small NGOs tend to focus on speciﬁc activities and may be more
selective in limiting the number of recipient countries in which they engage
(Koch et al. 2009: 906).
The dependence on external funding provided by a public donor has been
identiﬁed as a major factor for the aid allocation by NGOs (Fruttero, Gauri 2005:
761). Despite the charitable objectives of the aid intermediary, its decision-
making process may focus on the donor's preferences: What are the program-
matic priorities and what benchmarks are used to assess an organization? This
provides a strong incentive for the NGO to focus on measurable results  for
instance, the short-term reduction of the infant mortality rate instead of the
long-term beneﬁts of alternative programs for HIV/Aids prevention.
Philanthropic activities are donations (in kind or monetary terms) made by
individuals and organizations without any desire for personal returns. Private
foundations can act with complete independence, supporting innovative and
untested projects, funding research and investing their capital at below-market
rates of return. However, their funds and staﬀ are relatively small. (Kramer
2008: 216)
The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund)
and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) are entirely
new public-private partnerships designed to deliver development assistance for
health in fundamentally diﬀerent ways than have traditional aid agencies.
(Radelet, Levine 2008: 431). These new organizations were created because
donors apparently expected the reform and reorganization of existing agencies
to be more diﬃcult than to establish new mechanisms with diﬀerent operating
principles, mandates and objectives (Radelet, Levine 2008: 438).
Regardless of the diﬀerences between these types of aid intermediaries, they
aim at securing funding in order to guarantee their organizational survival. The
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acquisition of funds is the decisive element to be part of the international aid
business. An aid intermediary is assumed to maximize funding.
Given the structure of the aid system, one can conclude that donors and aid
intermediaries are essentially involved in a bargaining situation part of a multi
round game: The ability of one player to gain his ends depends to an important
degree on the decisions that the other player will make (Schelling 1960: 5).
Each of the players tries to reach the respective objective by using diﬀerent
strategies that take into account the reactions of the other player. Incentives and
transaction costs inﬂuence the bargaining between donors and aid intermediaries
whose outcome is visible in resource transfers known as foreign aid. The donor
uses the reputation and trustworthiness of the aid intermediary as indicator to
make an informed decision. The aid intermediary, in turn, focuses on indicators
used by the donor to assess its performance. Game theoretical analysis will help
to understand the economic rationale behind the process of aid allocation.
4 The games
The bargaining about aid between donor and intermediary is characterized by
imperfect information on one side. In this classic principal-agent problem, the
aid intermediary has information that is not available to the donor, but the
donor has no information to which the aid intermediary does not have access.
Only the intermediary knows whether he considers fulﬁlling the expectations of
the donor.
The two players maximize their utility. The utility numbers assigned to
outcomes of the game are ordinal utilities. They capture the player's ordering,
but neither provide they a measure of the intensity of a player's preference nor
can they be compared across players (Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 9). The players'
utilities are assumed to be directly proportional to their pay-oﬀs, in other words
they are risk neutral.
4.1 Game 1: The small-scale donor
The structure of the game in extensive form is shown in Figure 5. The game
consists of two rounds. The small-scale donor moves ﬁrst. Small means that
her ﬁnancial contribution is not substantial for the intermediary; the donation
is just one more.
Strategies
The ﬁnite strategy set consists of the following pure strategies available to each
player.
The donor (D) chooses among three possible strategies:
(1) {not to donate} = {n}
(2) {to donate; not to donate} = {d; n}
(3) {to donate; to donate} = {d; d}
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Figure 4: The bargaining process between small-scale donor and aid intermedi-
ary: An extensive game tree
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The aid intermediary (AI) has four possible strategies to choose from:
(1) {consider; consider} = {c; c}
(2) {consider; ignore} = {c; i}
(3) {ignore; consider} = {i; c}
(4) {ignore; ignore} = {i; i}.
In both rounds, D chooses between donating (d) and not donating (n). AI
chooses between two basic strategies, to consider or to ignore. The ﬁrst strategy
considers (c) the preferences of the donor. AI needs to know the indicators
used for performance assessment in order to satisfy the donor's expectations
through delivering results. AI bears costs to provide the desired outcomes
but it helps to guarantee future funding. The second strategy ignores (i) the
donor's preferences and their signiﬁcance as preconditions for future donations.
AI does not invest to satisfy these preferences. Thus, AI saves costs because
the organization does not need to change its strategy, produce any speciﬁc
outcome or exert any other additional eﬀort. When D is asked to move again
in the second round, he has not observed the intermediary's behavior. In game-
theoretical terms, he does not know at which information node he is.
Payoﬀs
The players are expected to rank their preferences in order to maximize their
expected utility as follows. The best possible scenario for D is the donation to be
used in her best interest by AI. The assigned payoﬀ is the highest (P dd1 = 10)).
The second best is if AI uses the donation in the expected way at least in the
second round. The assigned payoﬀ is relatively high (P dd1 = 7). If D decides to
not make a donation, D keeps the resources but also loses the opportunity to
pursue its objectives. The assigned payoﬀ is low (Pn1 = 2). In round two, D can
also opt out which would result in two diﬀerent outcomes. Although AI shows
the expected behavior in round one, D does not donate again in round two. D
erroneously observes misbehavior by AI. The assigned payoﬀ is low (P dn1 = 1).
In the alternative scenario, AI indeed ignores the other player's expectations in
round one. In round two, D decides to not donate again because he correctly
assumes misbehavior. The assigned payoﬀ is lower (P dn1 = 0). In both cases it
is also possible that D refrains from donating because he runs out of resources.
The second worst scenario for D is to assume AI to be using the donation
responsibly in the ﬁrst round. Based on this wrong assumption, D decides to
donate again in the second round, but AI ignores these expectations now. This
yields a negative payoﬀ (P dd1 = −1). The worst scenario for D is to donate
money in both rounds and to be ignored in both. D loses resources which are
not used as expected. The assigned payoﬀ is negative (P dd1 = −3).
The best possible scenario for AI is to receive donations and to ignore the
D 's expectations in both rounds. AI takes full advantage of the information
asymmetry. Funding is received but no resources are invested to satisfy D 's ex-
pectations. The assigned payoﬀ is high (P ii2 = 10). The second best outcome is
to receive donations in both rounds but to only consider the donor's preferences
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in the second round. AI is able to raise funds in both rounds but only starts
investing in the reputation of a reliable organization in the second round, antic-
ipating an ongoing relationship. This outcome yields a high payoﬀ (P ic2 = 8).
The third best scenario is to take D 's preferences into consideration in the ﬁrst
round but to ignore them in the subsequent round. AI helps fostering a trustful
relationship by showing a responsible behavior in using the donation. However,
the relation ends on a bad note because AI lacks attention in the second round.
The assigned payoﬀ is moderate (P ci2 = 7). Another scenario leads to a lower
utility level. AI takes the donation seriously from the beginning and the orga-
nization invests in a good reputation. On the one hand, it helps establishing
trust but, on the other hand, it also means that its own organizational objec-
tives are compromised for the sake of funding. The assigned payoﬀ is moderate
(P cc2 = 5). Two similar situations lead to slightly diﬀerent outcomes: In one
case, D decides to stop donating in the second round and AI actually ignores
the donor's preferences in the ﬁrst round. The relation ends after one round
and potential future funds are lost. However, AI has not diverted any resources
to satisfy D. The assigned payoﬀ is low (P i2 = 0). In the other case, D decides
to stop donating in the second round, although AI takes the donation seriously
and tries to satisfy the donor's expectations in the ﬁrst round. In other words,
AI 's investment in building reputation fails. The assigned payoﬀ is negative
(P c2 = −1).
Solution
According to the logic of backward induction, it is concluded what the player
moving ﬁrst will do by considering what the player moving second will do.
Players work out their strategies backwards; donor and aid intermediary induce
their beliefs about what constitutes the wisest choices by starting at the end and
then moving to the beginning (Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 91). In the ﬁrst round, D
chooses between d and n. The payoﬀ for not making a donation is relatively low
(Pn1 = 2). As a rational individual, D compares this payoﬀ to all other possible
outcomes of the game. If D plays d in round one, AI decides between c and i.
For the small-scale donor, it is basically impossible to control AI and therefore
to know how the donation is being used. Even if D has access to information
about AI provided by third parties, it means that another instance is involved
for which reputation is again an issue. Given that the intermediary is asked to
play, in other words to decide about the behavior with respect to the use of the
donation, AI also compares across all possible alternatives. In both cases, the
intermediary hopes for a second donation because the highest payoﬀs are related
to strategy i (P ci2 = 7 or P
ii
2 = 10). D anticipates AI 's behavior and therefore
compares the payoﬀs of strategy n in the second round with the possible payoﬀs
after playing d a second time. Due to AI 's preferences, D anticipates that the
second player will always play i in the second round. Given that D does not
know whether AI has taken the donation seriously in the ﬁrst place, D must act
based on previously formed beliefs. D randomizes between the left-hand side
and the right-hand side, each with probability one-half. Therefore, the relevant
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comparisons are on the left-hand side ((0.5x(P dn1 ) = 1 > (0.5x(P
dd
1 = −1) =
−0.5)) and on the right-hand side ((0.5x(P dn2 = 0) = 0) > (0.5x(P dd1 = −2) =
−1)). Consequently, D will always opt for strategy n in the second round. Given
this outlook, D will not donate in the ﬁrst round because to play the strategic
combination {d;n} yields a lower payoﬀ than the strategy {n}. Combining the
possible strategic decisions, the game ends with D playing n.
Interpretation
Apparently, the strategy d does not seem to make much sense. Why would the
donor even bother to make resources available if he can never be sure about the
aid intermediary's behavior? The same is true for the strategy i. If the donor
ever decided to make a donation, why would the intermediary ever bother about
the preferences of the donor? In reality, however, billions of dollars in form of
foreign aid are disbursed each year. Donors continue to make donations and
aid intermediaries often take donor's preferences into consideration. Why? The
game appropriately portrays the situation between one donor and one inter-
mediary in a single round game. AI may indeed end up taking the donor's
preferences into consideration for two possible reasons. First, due to the dy-
namic structure of the game in which D moves ﬁrst, AI knows, if asked to play,
that D made a donation. At this point, AI knows that D makes a material
`sacriﬁce' on his behalf and thus, AI experiences an urge to reciprocate. (If
that urge remains unfulﬁlled, the intermediary suﬀers some `psychological' loss.
(Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 276)). Second, AI is aware that even a small ﬁnancial
contribution from one donor is part of a much larger pool of ﬁnancial resources.
So, even though that simple small-scale donor lacks power to make a conditional
donation, the aid intermediary is aware of the importance of a good organiza-
tional reputation with regard to all small-scale donors. Thus, AI has much less
incentive to use the donation for other purposes. Put in a diﬀerent way: In
order to maintain the ﬁnancial ﬂow, AI needs to communicate the responsible
use of donated money. For D, in turn, such documentation proves to be taken
seriously, contributing to his satisfaction with having made a donation.
This means that in real life the aid intermediary has an incentive to establish
a good reputation over time, expressed in low overhead costs and responsible
use of donations. The optimal strategy for the intermediary is twofold: To show
and communicate the responsible use of donations as much as necessary in order
to establish the reputation of a trustworthy organization without compromising
the own objectives due to donor's preferences. The intermediary will document
projects and interventions in brochures, illustrated with pictures and informa-
tive texts. Although also the small-scale donor wants to be informed about
the organization's activities, less information in terms of ﬁgures and graphs is
required than for the large-scale donor. The intermediary has more freedom to
identify the important issues and develop a plan of action. Under the assump-
tion that the charitable objectives are pursued seriously, this should result in a
more eﬀective health-aid intervention in the long-run. For instance, there is less
pressure to present a quick drop in mortality rates and more time to invest in
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prevention and education.
4.2 Game 2: The large-scale donor
Diﬀerent from the previous game, we will now consider a large-scale donor and
an intermediary in a multi round game. Two diﬀerences are noteworthy: First,
diﬀerent from the other game, D has another strategic option in the second
round. D can sanction AI with a reduced donation to signal his dissatisfac-
tion about the previous lack of attention. Second, whereas a small-scale donor
can only vote with the feet in the subsequent round, the large-scale donor can
threaten the intermediary to reduce the donation in the next round. AI would
experience such as a reduction in funding. The principal still has imperfect
information about the agent's eﬀort. As a donor making a substantial ﬁnan-
cial contribution, the large-scale donor can expect some justiﬁcation how the
ﬁnancial resources are used. The large-scale donor has access to additional in-
formation because she has means to monitor the intermediary. In other words,
D knows in which part of the information set he is in the second round of the
game. The structure of the game in extensive form is shown in Figure 5.
Strategies
The ﬁnite strategy set consists of the following pure strategies available to each
player.
The donor (D) chooses among four possible strategies:
(1) {not to donate} = {n}
(2) {to donate; not to donate} = {d; n}
(3) {to donate; to donate} = {d; d}
(4) {to donate; sanction} = {d; s}.
The aid intermediary (AI) has four possible strategies to choose from:
(1) {consider; consider} = {c; c}
(2) {consider; ignore} = {c; i}
(3) {ignore; consider} = {i; c}
(4) {ignore; ignore} = {i; i}.
As before, D chooses between donating (d) and not donating (n) in the ﬁrst
round of the game. In the second round, he has the additional option to sanction
(s) the aid intermediary with a reduced donation for apparent lack of attention
to the donor's preferences.
AI chooses between two strategies, to consider or to ignore the expectations
of the donor. The ﬁrst strategy considers (c) the preferences of the donor:
which type of project is preferred, what are the expectations with regard to
health indicators etc. AI anticipates D 's preferences and the indicators that
are used as a benchmark and tries to deliver the corresponding results. AI
bears the costs of providing the desired outcomes but does help to guarantee
future funding. The second strategy ignores (i) the donor's preferences that
represent preconditions for future donations. In this case, the AI is aware of
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Figure 5: The bargaining process between large-scale donor and aid intermedi-
ary: An extensive game tree
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D 's preferences but does not invest in satisfying them. Thus, AI saves costs
because the organization does not need to change its strategy, produce any
speciﬁc outcome or exert any other additional eﬀort.
Payoﬀs
The players are expected to rank their preferences in order to maximize their
expected utility as follows. The initial decision to play strategy n in round one
yields a low payoﬀ (Pn1 = 2). Nevertheless, D reaches a higher utility level by
playing strategy n in round one (Pn1 = 2) than to play n in round two after
being considered (P dn1 = 1) respectively ignored (P
dn
1 = 0).
Under the assumption that D maximizes her satisfaction with thoughtful
donations, the best possible scenario for D is to see AI acting accordingly to
the preferences in the two subsequent rounds. The assigned payoﬀ is the highest
(P dd1 = 10).
The second best outcome for D is, if AI changes his behavior as reaction
to the sanction in the second round. Although this means that AI previously
ignored D, the latter can successfully inﬂuence AI. In addition, D saves some
of the resources thanks to the sanction. This strategy yields the second highest
payoﬀ (P ds1 = 9).
Two other scenarios are similar but lead to diﬀerent outcomes. In the ﬁrst
one, D plays d and AI plays i in round one, but then takes D 's expectations into
consideration in round two. Despite being ignored ﬁrst, D feels taken seriously
in round two. The assigned payoﬀ is high (P dd1 = 7). In the second one, AI
respects the donor's preferences in the ﬁrst round but then ignores them in
the second. This situation is less satisfying because it indicates a deteriorating
relationship. AI realizes that D 's threat is only cheap talk. A threat is called
cheap talk if it costs more to carry it out to the agent who issued it than not
carrying it out (Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 132). The assigned payoﬀ is negative
(P dd1 = −1).
If AI provides the expected information, D is satisﬁed with his apparently
eﬀective donation. Nevertheless, D decides not to continue the relation and
stops donating in round two. The assigned outcome is low (P dn1 = 1). A
possible reason could be that D has run out of resources. The decision to play
n is less inﬂuenced by AI 's previous behavior. If AI, however, does not show
the expected behavior, D keeps his resources in round two but feels fouled by
AI. The assigned outcome is low P dn1 = 0).
The second worst scenario for D is to threaten AI in the ﬁrst round and
to sanction him in the second round but without success; AI keeps on ignor-
ing D 's expectations. This scenario is a little better because D saves some
resources thanks to the sanction, but neither the threat nor the sanction lead
to a behavioral change. The assigned payoﬀ is negative (P ds1 = −2).
The worst case is to threaten AI in both rounds and to see him ignoring
the threat. It means that D threatens twice but without any visible behavioral
change by AI. D loses his credibility completely. This strategy yields the lowest
payoﬀ (P dd1 = −3).
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Assuming that AI maximizes funding by securing existing resource transfers
and raising new funds, the best possible scenario for AI is a donor who does
not sanction misbehavior directly. The most favorable scenario is to ignore D 's
preferences in both rounds without consequences. AI does not fulﬁll the donor's
expectations in the ﬁrst round but is not sanctioned. The donor's threat is in-
credible and D has lost his credibility. Consequently, the complete donation can
be used for organizational purposes. AI does not need to invest in reputation.
The assigned payoﬀ is the highest (P ii2 = 10).
The second best scenario is to not be sanctioned for previous misbehavior
and to signal interest in the donor's preferences in the second round. This
allows AI to save resources in the ﬁrst round but to continue receiving funds
later. This strategy allows to focus on own objectives in the ﬁrst round and
only in the second round funds are compromised to fulﬁll donor's expectations.
The assigned payoﬀ is high (P ic2 = 8).
The third best scenario is to take D 's expectations into consideration ﬁrst
but to ignore them later. AI helps securing its funding but does not invest
anymore in its reputation in the second round. The credibility of the donor is
challenged. The assigned payoﬀ is high (P ci2 = 7).
If AI takes the other player's expectations seriously in both rounds, AI loses
its independency. The own organizational objectives are compromised for the
sake of funding. The assigned payoﬀ is moderate (P cc2 = 5).
A less preferable scenario for AI is to be sanctioned for misbehavior. AI
considers D 's preferences in the second round. The sanction in form of a reduced
donation lowers the possible funding. AI saves resources in the ﬁrst round,
continues receiving funds, although a reduced amount, and invests some of these
resources to satisfy the donor. In the ﬁrst round, AI focuses on own objectives,
while funds are compromised to fulﬁll D 's expectations in the second round.
The assigned payoﬀ is low (P ic2 = 4). An even worse scenario for AI is to
be sanctioned for misbehavior and to continue playing i. AI endangers any
future relation because D gets the impression to not being taken seriously. D
sanctions AI for his previous lack of attention but the sanction does not induce
any behavioral change. AI spoils his reputation and loses potential resources
because of the funding cut in the second round. The assigned payoﬀ is low
(P ii2 = 1).
Another scenario is that AI ignores D 's preferences in the ﬁrst round and,
as a consequence, D ends the relation in the second round. AI is able to raise
funds in one round but loses D in the subsequent round. The assigned payoﬀ is
very low (P i2 = 0).
The worst scenario for AI is to take D 's preferences into consideration in the
ﬁrst round and to ﬁnd out in the subsequent round that D ends the relation.
AI invests as organization in a good reputation but loses D nevertheless. The
assigned payoﬀ is the lowest (P dn2 = −1). (The worst possible scenario for AI is
to not receive any donation in the ﬁrst round. This means that the game does
not start. The assigned payoﬀ for AI is the lowest (Pn2 = −2).)
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Solution
Using backward induction, the following combination of strategies can be con-
cluded. Once AI is asked to play, the player knows that D has made a donation.
In the ﬁrst round, AI decides between strategy c and i. If D 's preferences are
considered, two things can happen. Either D plays d again or D decides to end
the relation. In the latter, AI invests in building trust with D in the ﬁrst round
but the eﬀort is not honored in the second round. AI receives funding once but
his investment in his reputation does not pay oﬀ. If D decides to donate again
in the second round, AI decides between fulﬁlling and ignoring his expectations.
AI has an incentive to take D 's preferences into account in the second round.
However, AI will not take them into consideration in the ﬁrst round: AI risks
less but can potentially gain more by ignoring D in the ﬁrst round. Even if D
decides to end the relation after the ﬁrst round, AI is better oﬀ by ignoring him
during the ﬁrst round (P i2 = 0 > P
c
2 = −1).
If AI is ever asked to play, the player will rationally decide to ignore D 's
preferences. Then, AI can expect three diﬀerent scenarios in round two. On
the one hand, D can choose to end the relation because D notices that AI
does not take him seriously. On the other hand, if D plays d again, D can
simply make another donation or sanction AI for his previous lack of attention.
Contrary to the ﬁrst round, AI will pay attention to D 's preferences in the
second round, regardless of being sanctioned or not, in order to secure future
funding. Anticipating AI 's behavior, D has an incentive to play strategy s
in this round. D 's credibility is increased and it helps D to build a strong
reputation.
Despite the possibility to reach a payoﬀ (P d1 = 1) after the ﬁrst round
which is lower than to play strategy n in the ﬁrst place (Pn1 = 2), D has an
incentive to make a donation. The incentive is to establish a relationship over
time in which one depends on the other. D loses inﬂuence by transferring the
resources to AI but also has potential to inﬂuence because AI needs the external
funding. Once D has to move again in the second round, after having observed
AI played i, D plays s in order to sanction AI with reduced funding. Given
that AI is interested in establishing a reputation as reliable organization, AI is
incentivized, for instance, to provide D with the expected improvements in the
health indicators. The strategic combination {d; i; s; c} is a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies. These strategies of the players are best replies with respect to
each other.
Interpretation
A large-scale donor has more leverage on the donation than a small-scale donor.
Surprisingly, this does not lead to an instant behavioral change. AI has an
incentive to take D 's preferences into consideration in the long-run but not
directly after the ﬁrst donation. The more AI believes the donation to be a
one-shot contribution, the fewer incentives AI has to demonstrate a `respectful'
use of the resources. However, this is counterbalanced by a general necessity to
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have a good reputation. Although D can exert a lot of pressure to direct AI,
the latter can potentially beneﬁt from one speciﬁc aspect of health interventions
ﬁnanced with aid. If AI does not perform as expected, the organization was
either unable to present the required results or AI simply ignored D threat-
ening with funding cuts. Except for curative health interventions, most health
projects have a long time horizon. Prevention and education usually are not
able to produce immediate results. At ﬁrst sight, it could complicate the issue
of fund-raising for intermediaries: D expects certain outcomes after one year
but the health outcome remains pretty much the same due to the type of in-
tervention. An unintended consequence for AI could be a sanction in form of
funding cuts. However, AI can also take advantage of this time lag. Assuming
that health outcomes will not change in the short-term, AI could pretend to act
in D 's interest while the organization is actually pursuing its own objectives.
This means that AI has a strong incentive to not pay too much attention to D 's
preferences in the short-run but rather in the long-run. Of course, the oﬃcial
message needs to be another one in order to guarantee next year's ﬁnancial com-
mitment by the donor. AI needs to balance fund-raising, reputation building
and organizational objectives. The potential recipient is not necessarily on the
agenda.
4.3 Observations in practice
The analysis of the bargaining between donor and aid intermediary has shown
how the incentives lead to a situation in which the aid intermediary focuses on
the preferences of the donor. The importance of raising and securing funding
represents one crucial factor for the aid intermediary. The survival of the organi-
zation can only be guaranteed with a sound ﬁnancing concept. The dependence
on external funding has some consequences for the intermediary: Despite own
organizational, often charitable, objectives, the objectives of the donor are very
important.
The game illustrates that a small-scale donor has little direct leverage on the
aid intermediary. The intermediary takes the donation and uses it to pursue its
own objectives. A large-scale donor, private or public, has much more inﬂuence
on the aid intermediary's behavior. Credible threats and exercised sanctions
keep the aid intermediary on track. The bargaining over foreign aid is an on-
going process, a multi round game in which the aid intermediary's reputation
is a crucial factor to attract funding. The reputation is deﬁned by the overhead
costs, organizational image and previous behavior.
The German structure of development cooperation can serve as an exam-
ple. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ) is the main ﬁnancier of the German Society for Technical Cooperation
(gtz). When concepts for new projects are developed, the preferences of the
oﬃcials in the government department are anticipated. This helps to maximize
the number of projects commissioned and thus the funding. It also means that a
development expert with country-speciﬁc knowledge compromises the commu-
nicated needs of intended beneﬁciaries for the known preferences of an oﬃcial.
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Even if the expert is seriously interested in improving the health situation for
women and children, the bottom line is that her possibilities depend on the
ﬁnancier being convinced of the importance and success of the project.
Another consequence of the importance of funding is the discrepancy be-
tween short-term ﬁnancing interests and long-term developmental objectives
in form of improved health indicators. The aid intermediary needs to secure
funding on a yearly basis in order to guarantee ﬁnancial stability to maintain
projects. At the same time, however, the health projects often require a long-
term commitment. In particular preventive interventions with the aim to ed-
ucate people about diseases and healthy behavior are often characterized by a
signiﬁcant time lag between the intervention and a measurable change in the
health outcome.
5 Conclusions
Aid eﬀectiveness has been a contentious area of debate because, among other
things, aid allocation involves substantial resources. The allocation of aid is the
visible result of a bargaining process of several steps and with various actors.
Using development assistance for health as an example, it has been analyzed how
the diﬀerent maximization objectives of donors and aid intermediaries inﬂuence
their interaction. Neither private donor, nor public donor nor intermediary can
be assumed to act altruistically. Private and public donors have a variety of
possible motivations why they make resources available. In general, a donor
wants to maximize the possible impact of her donation in order to pursue her
objectives as eﬀectively as possible. Aid intermediaries maintain a higher level
of accountability with donors than with recipients respectively beneﬁciaries.
The focus on the donor-intermediary relationship provides some insights why
the needs of beneﬁciaries are not necessarily of great importance, despite the
oﬃcially communicated mantra.
Aid intermediaries depend on donors that provide ﬁnancial resources. An
intermediary tries to maximize its ﬁnancial possibilities that simultaneously
guarantee its organizational survival. The aid intermediary as agent depends
on the donor as ﬁnancial source. The donor as principal depends on the interme-
diary as organization that uses these resources. The portrayal of aid allocation
as a game with two players has oﬀered the following insights: Aid intermedi-
aries depend on external funding but play an important and powerful role in
the international system of aid allocation. The intermediary takes advantage
of the information asymmetry between the two players in order to improve its
bargaining situation. The donor donates resources and thereby loses control
over them but, at the same time, is interested in monitoring their use. It has
been pointed out that a distinction between small-scale and large-scale donor
makes sense. The former attaches certain expectations to her donation but has
very limited means to control and put pressure on the intermediary.
The two games illustrate aid allocation as the result of a continued bargain-
ing process between donor and aid intermediary to raise and allocate funds.
24
The small-scale donor, individually, lacks the power to put any pressure on the
intermediary. However, the much larger pool of many small-scale donors can
expect the provision of qualitative information. This means that the intermedi-
ary has an incentive to build a good reputation to attract and keep small-scale
donors. The image of a trustworthy organization is promoted by brochures and
other publicly available information. As a result, one can conclude that the
intermediary is forced to communicate its eﬀorts to satisfy those donors but is
relatively free in choosing its priorities for health projects, for instance. Under
the assumption that the organization cares about the intended beneﬁciaries,
we hypothesize that the relative freedom from small-scale donors leads to more
eﬀective and eﬃcient programs respectively projects.
The large-scale donor has much more speciﬁc expectations attached to the
donation. It hurts the intermediary more, if a ﬁnancially important donor is
lost (although also the sum of small-scale donors matters as has been seen
in many scandals about the abuse of donations that hit intermediaries hard).
The donor can demand speciﬁc results such as measurable improvements in
health indicators. If the donor's preferences are completely aligned with the
organizational objectives, the external pressure could result in better outcomes.
It seems more realistic, however, that the intermediary's attention shifts to
the donor's preferences: Own organizational objectives are compromised and
resources are diverted for the sake of delivering the expected results. A large-
scale donor asks for quantitative results which means that the data are more
speciﬁc and probably more diﬃcult to obtain. Under the assumption that the
organization cares about the intended beneﬁciaries, we hypothesize that the
higher the dependence on a large-scale donor, the less eﬀective are the programs
and projects. The extensive focus on the donor's preferences endangers the
development and maintenance of helpful health interventions.
Despite the powerful voice of donors, particularly the bigger they are, aid
intermediaries have a chance to avoid compromising their own priorities too
much. Particularly health interventions often require a rather long-term com-
mitment. Except for curative health care, results are not instantly visible and
often diﬃcult to measure. As we have seen in the two games, this temporary
independence could counteract the excessive focus on short-term results. The
intermediary can take advantage of the time lag between many health inter-
ventions and their outcomes. If the intermediary can oﬀer consistent arguments
why no immediate results can be expected from the health intervention, then the
intermediary gains additional time and increases its range for decision-making.
There is a discrepancy of short-term fund-raising and long-term health projects.
Surprisingly, more control through the donor can result in less eﬀective and ef-
ﬁcient health interventions. At the same time, particularly health projects and
programs provide the intermediary with an opportunity to justify the inability
to produce immediate results, with positive or negative eﬀects. Again, under
the assumption that the organization cares about the intended beneﬁciaries,
we can hypothesize that this temporary independence from the donor allows
for implementing more eﬃcient aid programs. Of course, if the intermediary
is not interested in the needs of the intended beneﬁciaries, then this relative
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independence could have the opposite eﬀect: The intermediary maximizes its
funding, regardless of the small-scale or the large-scale donor. This ﬁnding is
interesting in the context of the discussion on aid eﬀectiveness. The lack of
transparency and accountability is often criticized and better control mecha-
nisms are demanded. However, these measures are no panacea. This analysis
demonstrates that the form of control and its impact on the incentive scheme
matters.
The additional restriction of assuming a benevolent intermediary has been
crucial for the above hypotheses. The organizational objective of an aid inter-
mediary seems to play a decisive role in combination with the need for funding.
Particularly in the realm of NGOs, we ﬁnd very heterogeneous organizations. In
a next step, it would be interesting to analyze whether a systematical diﬀerence
can be found between faith-based NGOs and secular NGOs. The Christian com-
mandment to love your brother as yourself could be the distinctive feature that
results in a strong focus on the own objectives on behalf of the intermediary.
We hypothesize that Christian NGOs provide more eﬃcient health interventions
than secular ones.
Concluding, two possible drawbacks need to be mentioned. First, in the
analysis presented here, no distinction has been made between the individual
and organizational level with respect to donors. A citizen is an individual,
whereas a company is an organization. Aid intermediaries have been treated as
an individual in the game but, in reality, they are organizations. In the future,
it might be important to introduce this distinction because of possible collec-
tive action problems. Second, in the game, the aid intermediary is assumed to
decide between completely ignoring and fully considering the donor's expecta-
tions. Such a sharp distinction might be inappropriate in reality because the
intermediary is more likely to decide between `a little more' and `a little less'.
The aid allocation process comprises two important steps: acquisition of
funds and their allocation. The intermediary decides the aid allocation once the
funds have been raised. Focusing on the interaction of donor and intermediary,
the two games have illustrated how several factors can counteract each other
such as the dependence on funding, the need for measurable results, the time
lag inherent in many health interventions etc.
This more detailed understanding of the decisions involved in handling de-
velopment assistance for health in sub-Saharan Africa could be applied in con-
junction with empirical data to further delineate the roles of donors and aid
intermediaries in the promotion of basic health care on the African continent.
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